INTRODUCTION
Since the global financial crisis [GFC] of 2008, the quality of risk-related disclosures in the banking sector has become a matter of close scrutiny, especially by investors and regulators. Even before the GFC, the inadequacies of risk-related disclosures in annual reports had been a matter of public debate. Woods, 1 for example, drew attention to variations in the level and usefulness of risk-related information disclosed by companies and the difficulties involved in capturing risk exposures of companies. In 2008, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) emphasised that the banking sector often failed to disclose the magnitude of risk associated with their products clearly in an easily accessible way. 2 According to Heap, 3 this "led to […] a failure in confidence" in the financial system.
Although new breadth has been brought to risk reporting practices by International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 7 (Financial Instruments:
Disclosures), a lack of transparency in the risk reporting disclosures of banks has been found in periods prior to the adoption of IFRS 7, [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] and in studies after the adoption of IFRS 7.
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However, the representativeness of the results of these studies can be questioned on three major grounds. First, the small size of the samples used. Second, because banks are only a small part of the banking sector. We address this by analysing 190 credit institutions [PCIs] , including banks. And third, because the use of market-based measures (such as market capitalization) are an inappropriate mean of ranking banks by size -they incorporate "investors' viewpoints on company performance, thus ignoring other stakeholder groups".
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Stakeholder power can be proxied by the public visibility of an entity. Greater public visibility implies a greater need to heed stakeholders' expectations. 22 In Portugal, banks have a high degree of public visibility. Since 2006, the number of branches of credit institutions per 100,000 inhabitants has been almost three times greater than in
European Common Law countries (UK, Ireland and Netherlands). Among the European
Latin countries Portugal has registered the highest growth rate in the number of branches of banks.
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The present study focuses on the usefulness of disclosures about mandatory and Accounting Standards Board's conceptual framework for accounting, are used to assess usefulness: relevance, reliability, understandability and comparability.
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Despite focusing on risk-related disclosures before the adoption of IFRS 7, the present study also analyses operational risk-related disclosures and capital structure and adequacy disclosures, and levels of adherence to Basel II (Pillar III) requirements. Thus, the present study yields an exhaustive view of risk-related reporting disclosures practices in Portugal.
Results reveal that the adoption of IFRS led to greater amounts of risk-related information being disclosed compared to that required by the Portuguese Accounting
Plan for the Banking Sector [PAPBS] . Transparency across companies was impaired by comparability difficulties, by inability to understand narratives, and by the failure of narratives to explain numerical disclosures. The resulting imprecision, vagueness and misleading statements rendered readers susceptible to multiple interpretations.
Additionally, the results also reveal sub-optimal levels of mandatory risk-related disclosure in annual reports. The pre-GFC period transparency problems in Portuguese financial institutions were essentially the same as those detected in Anglo-Saxon studies. 4, 6, [8] [9] [10] [11] 16 The sub-optimal levels of mandatory risk-related information found in this study, and in studies before and after the adoption of IFRS 7, suggest that the recent Basel II Accord reforms, FSF recommendations, and IFRS 7 amendments would only lead to "socially desirable" flow of information if an appropriate enforcement mechanism assured compliance with minimum disclosure requirements.
In Section 2 we develop an analytical framework and briefly contextualise the regulatory setting in Portugal. Section 3 explains our research method and describes the sample. Section 4 reports the main results. Section 5 presents conclusions and recommendations.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Regulatory background
PCIs are supervised by accounting rules and reporting requirements issued by the 
Minimum disclosure requirements
Under the PAPBS there are very few disclosure requirements for risk matters. Those that exist relate to accounting policies (basically about impaired assets and provisions), credit risk (aging of assets according to maturity dates, details of impaired loans and advances), and liquidity risk (maturity analysis of current assets and liabilities). There is no requirement to disclose risk management information objectives, policies and control structure.
Under IAS/IFRS the risk-related disclosure requirements, described in Table 1, are more extensive and demanding.
(Insert Table 1 about here)
Although disclosures should be provided in the notes, it is also possible to find cross references in the management report, in accord with § B6 (IFRS 7). Narrative information about financial risk management objectives and policies should be presented in the notes in self-contained risk management sections (IAS 1.104-5). PCIs adopting either PASBS or IAS/IFRS have to disclose this kind of information in selfcontained section of the management report, also as demanded by Article 66 of the Portuguese Companies' Code.
Literature review
Although the banking sector is under-researched in terms of risk disclosures in corporate annual reports, 14 studies have examined the importance of risk disclosure on the market discipline of risk taking in the banking industry. Findings of such studies confirm that greater disclosure enhances market discipline and that better risk management systems attract investors. [28] [29] [30] Market discipline is defined as the "actions of shareholders, creditors and counterparties of banking companies [stakeholders] that can influence the investment, operational and risk-taking decisions of bank managers". 8 Due to the increasing complexity of financial activities pursued by banks, and consequently the inability to properly monitor and control financial companies, supervisory entities have relied on market discipline to assist in their oversight responsibility. "Market monitoring" 31 as a market discipline to limit banks' systemic risk is performed by unprotected creditors not covered by financial safety provisions.
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The greater the level and quality of disclosure, the greater the ability of stakeholders to monitor and assess changes in bank condition and to incorporate those assessments promptly into a firm's security price if negative changes occur. This monitoring mechanism generates market signals that convey useful information to supervisors in acting to reduce a bank's risk exposure. 31 The economic rationale is that in a substantially more complex environment, information disclosure is socially desirable.
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The literature on risk-related disclosures by banks has shown that market 
Finance sector preparedness for risk disclosure
Research from throughout the world reveals that managers and banks are ill-prepared to deal appropriately with risk exposures. In the USA a minority of banks used, or planned to use, in-house models of credit risk management. 40 Most senior managers of Nigerian banks were not fully prepared to manage liquidity risk exposure and were not conversant with known methods of measuring and managing a bank's liquidity exposure. 41 Spanish saving banks did not have good knowledge of the operational risk requirements of the Basel II Accord, they did not have an efficient organisational structure through which to implement an advanced operational risk information system, and their information systems were incapable of responding to Basel II requirements.
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Despite a good understanding of risk and risk management, staff of banks in the United Arab Emirates still needed to know how to prioritize their main risk efficiently. 43 Generally, Islamic banks are moderately efficient in risk assessment and analysis, risk monitoring and identification. 44 The risk measurement techniques they use predominantly involve maturity matching, gap analysis and credit ratings. Table 2 about here)
Method
We used content analysis to quantify the risk-related quantitative information and narrative information disclosed in the annual reports. All the items identified as risk disclosures required by IAS 1, IAS 30, IAS 32, IFRS 7 and the third Pillar of the Basel II Accord were included. 46 There were six risk disclosure categories (defined in Appendix A):
• risk management objectives and policies: risk identification and definitions, risk management policies, and whether there was a comprehensive risk report;
• credit risk: the size of credit risk exposure, size of past due and impaired assets, size of collateral (or other enhancements) held, and credit risk quality.
• market risk: market risk exposure, and internal/external risk measurement models.
• liquidity risk: liquidity risk exposure, and discussion of funding policies.
• operational risk: operational risk exposure and adaptation of information systems to Basel II requirements
• capital structure and adequacy: capital structure and amounts of Tier 1, 2 and 3;
capital adequacy for the different types of risk exposure and capital ratios; and capital adequacy approaches adopted under Basel II.
Content analysis was conducted in six stages, using a binary coding system. A credit institution was given a score of 1 if the item was reported, and 0 otherwise. Such disclosure scoring is useful in measuring the extent of, and variations in, the reporting practices of companies. 14 We coded information about the location of disclosures in the annual report, narratives, and the information included in graphs and tables. Content analysis of the entire sample was performed by the first author, informed by his prior coding of an initial sample of four annual reports with another (independently operating) coder. An inter-coder reliability test was undertaken 47 to measure the scale of coding errors (Scott's pi = 86%). Such a level has been considered "an acceptable level of inter-coder reliability" in analysis of corporate report disclosures. (Insert Table 3 about here)
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RESULTS
Accounting and risk management objectives and policies
Another surprising result is the low frequency of disclosure of risk management policies and control structure in financial holding companies. However, extended disclosures were made at a consolidated level.
Of the PCIs that adopted IAS/IFRS in their individual annual reports, the highest level of disclosure was by the other commercial and investment banks, and CFIs. But, the quality of risk reporting practices varied widely. At one extreme, two commercial banks provided comprehensive risk reports. These contained key risks and their definition, the description of the overall control structure by each risk factor, the risk management policies followed, the risk measurement models used to assess each risk factor, and a discussion of some strategic objectives. At the other extreme, several entities expressed their risk exposures without further explanation -they only provided risk definitions, or only detailed the overall control structure. Table 4 (Panel A) shows that, except for financial holding companies, mandatory information required by IAS 30 and IAS 32 was followed by all PCIs. They disclosed information about the size of credit risk exposure, and past due and impaired financial assets, thereby helping to assure comparability and confirming research by PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 21 However, understandability is undermined because narrative explanations of numerical information were lower than expected.
Credit risk
(Insert Table 4 about here)
Despite assurance of comparability on these two aspects, there are differences in the details itemised for credit risk exposure and past due impaired financial assets.
Disclosure of risk concentrations (by industry sector) had lower levels of disclosure.
The information most disclosed was aggregated information. Such information is less costly to produce than non-aggregated information and the proprietary costs are lower.
Because of their inherent proprietary nature, and the pre-GFC period of analysis, the size of collateral and the discussion of credit risk exposure show lower and different levels of disclosure. There were no disclosures for renegotiated assets. On the other hand, since this was voluntary information demanded by IFRS 7 only, another possible explanation for the lower levels of disclosure is the economic rationale that banks are "typically cautious to go beyond minimal disclosure requirements". 32 The disclosure level by companies adopting Portuguese accounting rules (the MACBs) are lower compared to those adopting IAS/IFRS. Despite this difference, the disclosures are consistent and, therefore comparable.
Among adopters of IAS/IFRS, there were higher levels of disclosure in other commercial and investment banks and CFIs, than in other entities. For commercial banks and CFIs, we also found higher levels of explanation of risk exposure in narratives, past due/impaired assets, and credit risk quality 49 -indeed, higher than those found by Bischof 17 in European commercial banks after the adoption of IFRS 7.
Moreover, the disclosures were close to IFRS 7 requirements, except for the size of collateral held and renegotiated assets. They also seemed to be preparing their credit risk information under Basel II rules, since credit risk information by type of credit exposure, geographic distribution, industry type, and residual contractual maturity, was at high levels.
Transparency flaws in credit risk disclosures are shown in Table 4 (Panel B).
PCIs that followed IAS/IFRS were not consistent in the amounts of credit risk exposure disclosed by industry sector and by maturing assets. Some PCIs indicated explicitly that the amounts disclosed included maturing and past due assets, whereas others indicated explicitly that the amounts disclosed only included maturing assets. In the worst case, no explicit information was provided, making it difficult for a reader to understand what amount was disclosed. Table 4 (Panel B) also shows differences in the maturity/aged time bands used to disclose the amounts of credit risk exposure by maturing assets, and past due assets, respectively. The differences are in the maximum range in the qualitative groups, and different time bands for the prior/no prior year figures. The same problems were detected in studies after the adoption of IFRS 7.
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Market risk showing how a positive or negative parallel shift in the interest rate curve would affect the gap. Only one commercial bank with a comprehensive risk report disclosed this kind of information. The lack of objectivity diminished the understandability of risk information. Instead, they presented a maturity analysis for current assets and liabilities, but separately.
Liquidity risk
(Insert Table 6 about here)
In respect of the PCIs that adopted IAS/IFRS, These practices make it difficult for users to assess banks' liquidity risk exposure appropriately, or build a liquidity gap table. Consequently, comparability across companies is rendered difficult. (Insert Table 7 about here) Capital structure and adequacy Table 8 (Panel A) shows the highest level of disclosure for capital structure and adequacy was by banks (MACBs, other commercial and investment banks). One plausible reason for this might be the assumption that higher levels of public visibility will increase banks' needs to legitimise themselves to their customers, to inform them of their ability to avoid a banking crisis, and to protect depositors. These reasons have been used to explain the objectives of capital adequacy requirements.
Operational risk
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(Insert Table 8 about here) However, few of these PCIs have included narrative disclosures to critically discuss the amounts calculated for total eligible capital value. As a consequence, understandability is impaired.
Six banks (other commercial/investment banks) disclosed the approaches they followed to assess capital adequacy, capital requirements for credit, market and operational risk, and total capital ratio according to Basel II ( 
CONCLUSIONS
When compared to Portuguese accounting rules, the adoption of IAS/IFRS has brought a greater flow of risk-related information. This was despite the risk information disclosed using Portuguese accounting standards being more comparable. Consistent with previous studies, 21 the greater flow of risk-related information did not assure transparency across the Portuguese banking sector.
Portugal is classified as a "Latin country", and the Portuguese banking system has several characteristic features (such as its prominent visibility as a consequence of the greater number of branches). We found that the two commercial banks with better risk reporting performance had the highest number of branches, and are listed in a regulated market (Euronext Lisbon), and in a foreign stock exchange market. However, among the PCIs with a lower number of branches (CFIs and other entities) we found that the transparency flaws were more intense compared to commercial banks and previous literature. Among financial holding companies there were low levels of disclosure because they opted to make extended disclosures at a consolidated level. Risk reporting practices among investment banks are similar to those of commercial banks.
But, this is not explained by public visibility. Their number of branches is much lower.
However, most of the investment and commercial banks belong to the same financial groups, which may explain that similarity.
Lack of transparency was found in the minimum binding disclosure requirements, and also in voluntary disclosures (for example, in respect of operational risk, capital structure and capital adequacy). These sub-optimal levels of usefulness impacted negatively on the effectiveness of market discipline in several ways.
Assuming usefulness to investors is a direct function of attaining the qualitative characteristics of relevance, reliability, understandability, and comparability, our findings for PCIs that have adopted IAS/IFRS confirm previous research. 4, 5, [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] As in other countries, transparency across companies was impaired by comparability difficulties. Breaches of the other three desired qualitative characteristics of financial statements were found too. This reduces the usefulness of risk-related information in decision making, because users face considerable difficulty in capturing the appropriate risk profile of a credit institution and in comparing that profile across the sector.
The potential understandability of narratives was poor. This was compounded by a lack of narratives to explain numerical disclosures. The result is a potential increase in the probability of multiple interpretations by readers, arising from the imprecision, vagueness and the misleading nature of the statements made. Numerical risk disclosures were useful, but not fully transparent. They lacked reliability (for example, VaR statistics) because no stress tests or back tests were made to assure the reliability of those statistics under different scenarios or because non-parametric methods of measurement were used. And they lacked comparability across companies too, because the disclosure practices differed. Further, they are likely not to be understood fully by users, because they are not aligned with narrative explanations. Users do not know if the information relates to bad news or good news, because usually, no further information is given. Where given, it is dispersed throughout the annual report.
Considerable sub-optimal levels of mandatory disclosures of market risk, liquidity risk, and risk management objectives and policies were found among PCIs.
Similar sub-optimal levels were found in prior research before the adoption of high quality standards such as IFRS 7, 5, 8, 10, [13] [14] [15] [16] and by banks in Anglo-Saxon countries.
Credit risk disclosures presented optimal levels of mandatory compliance, similar to the findings of Frolov 7 and KPMG.
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Although we did not analyse risk disclosures after the adoption of IFRS 7, Furthermore, the principles-based nature of IAS implies the use of professional judgement leading to non-comparable reporting practices. An obvious conclusion seems to be that institutions with risk-related disclosures should work together to require a consistent disclosure process. The Portuguese finance sector is composed of credit institutions and financial companies. Decree-Law 298/92 defines credit institutions as "companies whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own accounts" (Article 2). Financial companies are "companies that are not credit institutions" (Article 5). This study deals only with risk-related reporting practices of credit institutions.
In recognition of the different business goals of banks, we categorised them as commercial banks and investment banks. Financial holding companies are financial companies registered by the Portuguese Central Bank. They hold and control equity shares of PCIs included in the sample. Notice 1/2005 of the Portuguese Central Bank also applies to financial holding companies whose subsidiaries are credit or investment companies. To be considered a financial holding company their subsidiaries should represent at least 50% of consolidated assets. However, the Portuguese Central Bank can propose other criteria.
Other entities deal with leasing, factoring, and mutual guarantee activities; investment companies; and credit-purchase financing companies not classified as banks or credit financial institutions. 
